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Liberalism and ethnicity in South African politics. 1921-1948
One of the main problems confronting liberal ideology in
the South African context is the nature and role of group
identities. This has been no small question because liberal
theorists have tended to be hide-bound by a reliance on the
inherent rationality of a free market that specifically excludes
the role of group interests from its sphere of operations. Thus,
while twentieth century liberalism has made a number of important
revisions in the classical laissez-faire model of the nineteenth
century (I), it still places a considerable emphasis on the free
market sector even though, as Professor John Kenneth Galbraith has
observed, this now typifies only a minority sector in western
capitalist economies (2). It is this dependency on the free-
market model, however, that restricts the liberal view of
rationality to one of economics. The most rational figure in
this view remains the classic homo economicus. the child of the
Eighteenth Century Enlightenment, who buys in the cheapest market
and sells in the dearest.
The implications of this model are far-reaching in terms of
J social values. If the basis of society is seen to rest on free-
floating individuals motivated by a high degree of psychological
hedonism then the basis of society's values rests on individual
ones to the neglect of the wider community. This is perhaps one
reason why capitalist societies in the west have had such
difficulty, for example, in regulating and controlling firms
involved in spreading pollution: the traditional free-market
model only assumes a relationship between buyer and seller and
cannot account for a third party involved in the transaction
in the form of the community (3). Moreover, in terms of its
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system of morality, liberalism relies on a general public good
accruing from the actions of individuals: by some mysterious
hidden hand, "public good" is assumed to emerge from "private
vices". As Robert Paul Wolff has argued, liberalism is unable
to make the jump, short of radical revision, from the notion
of a private value to one of community. Utilitarianism, he
argues, in its concern for the greatest happiness for the
greatest number, rests only on private values and a develop-
ment of liberalism towards the direction of interpersonal values
is the only way of resolving this problem and developing a ~
-. >
liberal morality that recognises the existence of a wider
community (4).
The most serious charge, then, against the liberal ideology
in the twentieth century is that it has singularly failed to
recognise the salience of group interests. This has had, in
turn, serious implications for liberals in South Africa. Racial
ideology, for example, has been explained away by liberals as
autonomous to the rationality of the free-market and dysfunctional
for the long-run maintenance of the economic system. In its most
extreme form, this can be seen in Michael O'Dowd's "stages of v
growth" theory which assumes that South Africa, through the logic
of the free market, will emerge as a liberal-democracy by around
1980 (5). But similar assumptions are to be seen in a number of
other works written in the liberal tradition. In the Oxford
History of South Africa, for example, there has been an implicit
assumption in a number of chapters, especially those by Francis
Wilson and David Welsh (6), that the inherent rationality of the
urbanisation process in the twentieth century has been distorted
by the irrational nature of racial ideology. What has been
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overlooked is the possibility that the two may have been mutually
re-inforcing and that urbanisation and industrialisation may have
been actually promoted by an ideology of racial separatism.
What liberalism in South Africa has ignored, therefore, is
that the overall functioning of the economic system can be seen as
rational, despite the continued prevalence of a racial ideology* *"'
As Ruan Maud has argued, the economic-determinist model of the
liberals ignores "the crucial intervening cultural variable which
leads people from dissimilar backgrounds to interpret natural and
social reality in a variety of different ways" (7) and that
) seemingly "traditional" values from the pre-industrial and colonial
era not only survive under industrialism and urbanisation but
become expanded and devloped.to fit a new social order.
In this respect, liberals in South Africa need to pay much
greater attention to the nature and role of ethnicity in South
Africa's political development. The term has been used comparatively
recently by social analysts with the most significant date being
1960-61 with the publication of Beyond the Melting Pot by Nathan
Gl*zer and Daniel Moynihan (8). This book argued, on the basis
of a study done in New York, that ethnicity in American society was
"not a survival from the age of mass immigration but a new social
form" (9). Thus, even while various distinctive traits like
language, customs and culture that the immigrant groups brought
with them to America may have declined in the "melting pot" of
American mass culture, ethnic identities "are continually recreated
by new experiences in America" (1O) . The implications of this
thesis for South Africa are fairly evident. As urbanisation
spread in the twentieth century, it was unreasonable to expect the
disappearance of ethnic identities in a new polyglot culture; on
the contrary, new identities were to be formed and a new pattern
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of group identities emerged. The most significant for South
Africa's political development was, of course, Afrikaner nationalism
which emerged as a new and vibrant factor from the 1920s onward
together with the trek of Afrikaans speakers from the platteland
into the towns.
What is important in this process is that the rise of Afrikaner
nationalism was not an atavistic and backward looking movement,
rely-ing sol^ el£ oil th'« myth, of the two Boer Republics, but was very-
much concerned with the economic regeneration of the Afrikaner
within the new urban context. This concern with modernisation in
turn explains the rise of the apartheid ideology by the middle 1940s •""'
as the means by which Afrikaner nationalists could apply their
ethnic model to the South African economic system.. Thus, instead
of seeing apartheid, after Pierre van den Berghe, as an "anachronistic
white elephant" (II) or after Les Kuper, as " a transient doctrine,
since it is invalid in the sense that it is not consistent with the
social structure and does not allow for the accommodation of action
to the new and changed situation of industrial integration" (12),
we must rather look to it as the means by which ethnic identities
could be preserved within a new industrial society and as a method ;.A
of actively fostering this continued industrialisation.
At this point, we are faced with an analytical problem.
Social scientists are still not quite sure how the ethnic model
is to be used and, as a recent volume edited by Nathan Glazer and
Daniel Moynihan suggests, we are still within the stage of the
development of an overall theory. (13)• Clearly, one crucial
component to ethnicity as its economic base and it is necessary
to see exactly how and in what manner ethnic group identities
relate to the surrounding economic system. In their earlier
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volume based on the New York study, Glazer and Moynihan suggest
that the ethnic group behaves very much as an interest group
within the urban setting, thus hinting that the model can be
integrated into general interest group theory (14). But the
growth of racial consciousness in America in the latter part of the
1960s and the polarisation of values that it has produced suggests
that ethnic groups are more than mere interest groups operating
within an overall framework of value consensus (15). Thus some
social scientists have turned away from seeing ethnicity within
TX the mould of structural functionalism and have seen it as operating
within a model based on continued value conflict. Frank W. Young,
for example, has looked towards "reactive subsystems" as a means
of explaining contemporary group conflict and have seen them as
examples of collective group behaviour which depend upon "the
formal patterning of the symbolically represented meaning areas
in the group" (16). This emphasis on group symbols as a means
of defining ethnic identity has, in turn, been taken up by Michael
Hechter in a study of voting patterns on the "Celtic Fringe" in
Britain, Arguing that ethnicity has too often been seen by social
* scientists as a given and defining attribute of a particular social
group and less as a phenomenon to be explained, Hechter sees the
importance of ethnicity in terras of its ability to actively
influence the system of social stratification within a society (17),
The resulting implication is that the very functioning of the
economic system must be seen to depend on patterning of ethnic
identities which define what Hechter calls the "cultural division .
of labour" (18) .
This ability of ethnic groups to influence the structure of
social stratification suggests important implications for the use
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of-.the ethnic model in future social analysis. It implies, for
example, a revision of much analysis based on class divisions
within contemporary industrial societies. (19) . >
The economic basis of ethnicity, is clearly a key factor
in the promotion of ethnic identities and it may thus be apposite
to look for some kind of a relationship between ethnicity and - j;
class as a means of explaining the group patterns within industrial
societies. The prevalence of ethnic consciousness over class
consciousness need not be put down to "false consciousness" as much
as vulgar marxist analysis would tend to suggest. It would seem,
in fact, that the saliency of ethnicity rests upon the manipulation
of cultural symbols within the ethnic group and here class interests
can be seen to come into play. Ethnic group consciousness may,
indeed, be an ideological means by which certain class groupings
attain the necessary economic basis to be bale to launch themselves
into an industrial society. This is because many of the
industrialising economies in the twentieth century are post-colonial
ones where the previous colonial elite has abandoned power: thus
political power does not directly accrue from class interests as
the classic marxist model suggests. The promotion of class
interests, in fact, depends on precisely the opposite means in the
form of the capture of political power and then the fostering of
class divisions. It is, in other words, a kind of marxist model
stood on its head. Ethnicity, in this context, is precisely
this means towards the attainment of political power and it is
thus not surprising that ethnic conflict is so prevalent in much
of the Third World.
Since 1910, the growth of ethnicity can be clearly perceived
in the era of post-colonial politics in South Africa. At the
time of Union, the dominant economic interests were those of the
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gold and diamond mining industries which remained under expatriate
control. But as industrialisation began to get under way after
the First World War so new interests and economic structures
began to be formed. Manufacturing, for example, grew from
4O,4 million rands in 1920 to 99,3 millions in 1939, while
between 1932/3 and 1938/9 the national income rose from £234,7
millions to £394,8 millions alone. The urban composition of the
population also changed fairly rapidly as -the rural areas became
depopulated outside of the native reserves. H.A. Shannon estimated
^ that between 1904 and 1936 percentage of "urbanized" Europeans
rose 1O,7 to 13,1 and Africans from 5,9 to 11,2. (20). In
absolute terms the numbers of urban whites doubled between
1911 and 1936 from 658,300 to 1307,4000 while Africans rose from
508,1000 to 1141,600 over the same period. In this context, it
was not surprising that there was going to be a struggle over scarce
resources.
This conflict could have taken a class form, with Afrikaner
uniting with English-speaking workers to form a common front
against mining capital and its concomitant interests. This had
J seemed a possibility up to the time of the 1922 Rand Strike when
the majority of striking miners on the Reef were Afrikaans-
speaking. The unity, in fact, of all white workers had
traditionally been the hope of the South African Labour Party
which had sought to mobilize Afrikaans-speaking voters on a class
basis as far back as 1915. A pamphlet printed that year by the
SALP had argued against participation in the First World War and
had sought to mobilize workers against imperialism:
Dit is die belang van die kapitalist partije om die Arbeids
Partij te beweeg om sij teenwerking te laat vaar. ^ Hul wil
he dat ons hul sienswijse anvaar. Hul streef onsininglik
om ons te dwing ons bestaan te laat vaar in alle lande, deur
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ons te wil lei om ons spesiale werk om die mensheid tot
rede te bring op te gee* (21) .
But, as David Ticktin has shown, the SALP was never
successful in its appeal to Afrikaans-speaking workers, hampered
as it was by its attitude to the war and the imperial connection.
(22). After a poor showing in 1915 the party went on to win
18 seats in 1920, after which its showing in Parliament pro-
gressively deteriorated and it was by 1924 forced into coalition
with the Nationalists if it was ever to gain any political power.
The result, was that the Nationalists were able to appeal
increasingly to Afrikaans-speaking workers in an ethnic basis. )
The Nationalists were able to hold their own in Parliament and
after 1924 they began to implement a programme that stabilised
the industrial colour bar and consolidated the white working
class within the South African economy. This was electorally
successful for in 1929 the Pact Government, now overwhelmingly
dominated by Hertzog after the SALP had split in 1928 (23),
was able to beat Smuts and the SAP in the "Black Manifesto"
election. The gains, however, made by the Nationalists by the
end of the 1920s were mainly confined to the industrial spehere N
(i.e. legislation protecting white worker interests against non-
white competition) and cultural and language matters: in 1925,
for example, Afrikaans was recognised as one of the two national
languages while the national flag, after a long controversy, was
extablished by 1928.. The actual economic position of the
L
Afrikaner within the economy remained to be settled.
Here i t had long been recognised that Afrikaners as a
group were seriously disadvantaged compared to English-speakers.
When the "Second Great Trek" to the towns began after the Boer War,
- 9 -
many Afrikaners tended to move into relatively poor suburbs where
there was low-cost housing. This tended to perpetuate the
poverty syndrome of the platteland in the new urban context.
In 1932, the Carnegie Commission concluded that the number of
"poor whites" could be as many as 220,000 persons, a high
percentage of whom were Afrikaans-speakers (24). But Afrikaans-
speakers also tended to hold the lower rungs in terms of jobs
within the white economy: by 1936, for example, some 59% of
whites in public administration were of the Afrikaans language
group (25) . It was not surprising therefore that within this
context Afrikaners were easily capable of being made to feel
under-privileged.
One solution had been put forward as early as the first
decade of the twentieth century. This was basically one of
ethnic capital formation and the accumulation of sufficient
savings as a meanings of collective economic upliftment. The
scheme was principally associated with Dr J.D. Kestell who, as
a Predikant at Kimberly, had proposed such a scheme in 1907 (26).
The objectives of the Nationalist elite after 1914, however, remained
)^ essentially ones of achieving political, social and cultural
equality with English-speakers and Hertzog's "two streams" policy
did not include any scheme for ethnic economic mobilization.
By 1929 however, there began a radical transformation within
Afrikaner nationalism such that Kestell's ideas gained increasing
acceptance. Professor T. Dunbar Hoodie, for example, has
shown that the formation in 1929 of the Federasie van Afrikaanse
Kulturvereniginqs marked an upturn in the "Afrikaner civil
religion". The FAK was crucial, he argues, in the development
of a "new ethnic conception of culture" (2 7). In particular, it
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was instrumental in extending the conception of a "Christian
National" sacred history. The FAK, however, was under the
control of the Broederbond whose role, during the 1930s was to
be crucial "both in organizing the rising Afrikaner elite, and
in providing an interpretation of the civil theology which
was tight enough to unite Afrikaners and yet loose enough to
allow considerable difference of opinion on practical matters"
(28). These developments were also to be aided by a crucial
idelolgical transformation by the inportation of what Moodie
calls "neo-Fichtean nationalism" from young Afrikaner intellectuals
like Dr Verwoerd, Dr Geoff Cronje, Dr T.G. Hugo, Dr Piet Meyer
and Dr Diederichs who had pursued studies in Europe. These
nationalists were insturmental in establishing the Afrikaanse
Nasionale Studentebond in 1933 in opposition to NUSAS, while
also being influential in Nasionale Pers publications and
Die Volksblad. It was on the latter organ that Dr Kestell
had had a regular column after 1929 (29).
By the latter part of the 1930s, therefore, this strongly
ethnic conception of nationalism, which was epitomised by
Diederichs"s pamphlet in 1936, Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing.
became closely linked to ideas on economic self-regeneration
(Helpmekaar). Indeed, it can be argued that the two were
essentially mutually complentary and that the new ethnic
consciousness that was being espoused by the elite depended upon
the establishment of a sound economic base. To this extent,
Moodie1 s conception of the problem as being one merely of
"integrating the symbols of the civil faith into the problems of
urban industrial life" (30) fails to grasp the relationship between
the ethnic group consciousness that was being promoted and its
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material pre-requisites. This is partly because he insists on
looking at the historical development of Afrikaner nationalism
through the Webeian ideal-type of "civil religion" which is
defined in terms of its "reference to power within the state"
(31), whilst ignoring the material pre-conditions for that
power. For once a sufficient fund of ideological commitment
had been built up amongst the Afrikaans-speaking population,
and, the land-mark here was the 1938 Ossewa Trek, the new
Afrikaner nationalist elite was able to extend this commitment
into an economic one of capital mobilisation and the accumulation
•'J of sufficient savings to fund the rise of a new Afrikaner
entrepreneurial elite- (32).
The key step in the development of this capital mobilization
was the calling of an Economic Congress at Bloemfontein on the
3, 4 and 5 of October 1939. The arguments of the various speakers
at the Congress illustrated the intention of using the Afrikaner
ethnic group as a means of capital formation. Professor L.J.
du Plessis, for example, declared:
...die volk het in sy selfbewuswording ook hiervan bewus
geword en die nuwe ekonomiese volksbeweging stel hom ten
*\ doel om hierdie proses om te keer, om nie verder toe te
J
 laat dat die Afrikaanse volk verwoes word in 'n poging
om hom aan te pas by 'n uitheemse kapitalistiese stelsel
nie, maar om die volk te mobiliseer tot verowering van die
uitheemse stelsel om dit om te skep en aan te pas aan ons
volksaard (33).
In addition, in a forthright paper on the mobilization of
capital and savings by the Afrikaner, Dr T.E. Oonges argued that
the reasons why Afrikaners had hitherto been so unsuccessful in
making their capital bear fruit were twofold: psychological
(sielkundigj and technical. The psychological reason lay in the
tradition of Afrikaners to invest in concrete objects that could
be seen like houses and land so that "Dit is maar selde dat hy
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in Afrikaanse handels van nywerheidsondernemings bele, gedeeltelik
omdat daar nie baie sulke ondernemings is nie en gedeeltelik
omdat hy in baie gevalle afgeskrik is deur mislukkings van sulke
besighede war met onvoldoende kapitaal of besigneidsleiding en .
dikwels sonder behoorlike ondersoek opgerig is" The technical
reason lay in the fact that there were few investments available
for the Afrikaner to make his capital bear fruit. There were, for
example, no large secondary industry or business on any extensive
scale that was managed by Afrikaner capital. The only solution
to this problem argued Donges, was the creation of an investment
organisation that was able to mobilize disposable Afrikaner :;;/
capital which depended upon the "aanmoediging van spaarsin en die
voorsiening van behoorlike spaarfasiliteite sodat spaargeld in
kapitaal verander kan word" (34) (emphasis added).
From these arguments it is clear that, despite the
professed anticapitalist sentiments expressed by many speakers, the
main thrust of the Congress was to gain access by collective organi-
sation into the existing capitalist system, dominated as it then •
was by English and Jewish capital. (35). The appeal to ethnic
sentiment was a crucial means by which this mobilization of ..
resources was to be achieved and represented, in fact, the
expression of a kind of class consciousness by the rising
Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie. The organisations that were to
emerge as a result of this Congress illustrated the masking of
these class interests through ethnicity: they were the Handel-
sinstituut, or the Afrikaans chamber of commerce, the Ekonomiese
Instituut. concerned with economically uplifting the Afrikaner,
and, most importantly, the Reddinqsdaad bond which was headed by
Dr N Diederichs. This was a mass-based organisation that by
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1943, so Diederichs claimed, had 400 branches and 4OOO active
helpers (36). The RDB seems to have been the most crucial
organisation for the mobilization of funds essential for the
growth of a specifically Afrikaner capitalism. In March 1941,
for example, a five year plan was announced in order to collect
£1*3 millions which had as its target 5000 people subscribing £1
a year, 6000 people 16sh. a year, 7,500 people 10,000 2sh. a year
and 10,000 lsh. a year (37). Centainly, the long-term effects
for Afrikaner capitalism were significant for between 1939 and
1949 the number of undertakings owned by Afrikaners increased
) from 5% to 10% of the national total, while the number of Afrikaner
industrial undertakings rose from 2,428 to 9,585 over the same
period. By 1949, it was estimated that Afrikaner capitalists
were in control of 6% of the nation's industry and 25 to 30%
of its commerce (38). Cellective mobilization of capital was
clearly paying off.
In this context, centain questions on the liberal response
to the ethnic mobilization of Afrikaner capital needs to be
asked. The emphasis, in fact, on most studies of this period
^ has been on the specific trends within either Afrikaner nationalism
or within liberalism, as represented by the Hofmeyr wing of the
United Party and the South African Institute of Race Relations.
(39). There has been little or no light thrown on their
interaction which is essential in order to understand the long-
term thrust within South African politics.
This point needs emphasising for if by the end of the 1930s
Afrikaner nationalism had become increasingly ethnic and exclusive
in its nature then at the same time English-speaking capitalism
was becoming increasingly subject to the criticisms of liberals
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both within and without the political system. This critical
opposition was to gain increasingly in its effectiveness during
the course of the Second World War.
Crucial to the understanding of this liberalism is the
socio-economic context in which it developed. As Martin ,
Legassick has shown. South African liberalism has to be seen in
terms of the extension of the liberal ideas from the missions
and the Cape to a new urban and industrialising environment
after the First Warld War (40). Out of this environment there
grew in the 1920s the Joint Council movement, originally sparked
off by the arrival of the Phelps-Stokes Commission under Aggrey •v')
and Jesse Jones in 1921, and in 1929, through the mediation of
C.T. Loram and the Carnegie Commission, the South African Insti-
tute of Race Relations, which had as its "adviser", J.D. Rheinnalt-
Jones. The weakness of these groups perhaps lay in the fact
that they were never able to develop a sufficiently strong con-
ception of the nature of the society that they wished to foster
and sustain. This may well have been a product of the in-
creasingly despondency and self-doubt experienced by liberals
in the West generally between the wars and discussed, for example,
in such books as Walter Lippmann's The Good Society and Herold
Macmillan's The Middle Way. The best strategy on hand, indeed,
lay in tinkering with the existing systme and "muddling through"
in the best way possible: this certainly tended to be the case _ ._;_
until the popularisation of Keynes's work in the latter part of "
the 1930s and the "pump-priming" of the economy through public
expenditure in order to bring it out of recession. But even this
only became successful when the Second World War brought with it
massive state expenditure in such countries as Britain and America
on armaments.
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The model open to the liberals, then, was not a particularly
finished and well-rounded one. In addition, the liberal plant
was difficult to cultivate in the somewhat arid conditions of
South Africa. The essential political consensus of such
liberal democracies as America and Britain was lacking in
South Africa where the salient political cleavages by the
1920s centred around national (more commonly known then as
"racial") identities. The initial response of the liberals .
was to hope that nationalism and liberalism were capable of
being reconciled. Edgar Brookes, for example, who had been a
supporter of Hertzog's segregation policy in the early 1920s
and had openly championed his cause in the 1924 election,
wrote in his pamphlet The Political Future of South Africa in
1927 that a possible reconciliation of nationalism and liberalism
could well come about with the next generation of university
students. This hope, doubtless fostered by the Versailles Peace
Conference and Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points also looked
forward to a united European opinion regarding native policy
which would be based on the provision of adequate land for
separate native development. Such a policy would help foster
a common European nationality in South Africa and it would be
the "task of the future liberal party of South Africa...to
preserve this happy compromise" (41).
These early hopes, however, were to be dashed by the 1930s
where, in South Africa as in Europe, nationalism grew increasingly
intolerant of liberal aspirations and the edeals of the post-war
Wilson reconstruction were smashed. In South Africa, the emergence
of the increasingly ethic conception of Afrikaans culture prohibited
the emergence of a common European nationalism: a development in
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fact that did not really begin to take place until the middle
1960s on the basis of Afrikaner nationalist hegemony (42).
The response of liberals to this situation was to retreat from
any attempt at reconciliation between nationalism and liberalism
and to expouse the classical liberal model of social relations
based on the unit of the individual. in 1933, for example,
Edgar Brookes in his Phelps-Stokes Lectures entitled The Colour
Problems of South Africa argued that "The great work of nationalism
in South Africa has been done" so that, while "a moderate and .
inclusive nationalism could still do good" it would be "to
misread the signs of the times" to "carry on Exclusive and rr-j)
intolerant nationalism" (43). Above all the aim should be
a "higher ideal of patriotism" which made "all South Africa
the goal of our endeavours" and to realise that:
South Africa can only be great if the individual members
of the community, be they Black, White or Brown, are great.
Let us treat individuals as individuals, as persons, entitled
to respect, and to recognition on their merits, not merely as
members of artificially defined and limited groups (44)
(emphasis added).
The implication of this liberalism was a clear rejection of
the group and ethnic basis of contemporary South African society
and the championing of a society more closely resembling the :';u
liberal-democratic societies of America and Western Europe.
The results, however, for South African liberalism were, in the
long-term, to be disastrous.
The articulation of liberalism based upon the unit of the
individual in South Africa had the effect of forcing liberals
to work inside the existing political system without being able to
suggest any radical alternative. The implicit assumption that
liberal ideals could be best achieved by gradual reform within
what was accepted as a perliamentary system (45) meant that
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liberals were unable to suggest any significant alternative
social model to the segregationist ideals of the majority of
politicians in the House of Assembly and Senate in the 1920s
and 1930s. As W.M. Macmillan recalled of this period in the
Joint Councils nad the Institute of Race Relations before he
left South Africa in 1932:
Despite (a) lack of faith in leading politicians one had
to work with them. Among the Africans themselves there
may have been movements of which we*knew very little;
these are now being explored by research workers, but I
can only say that at the time they appeared wholly
inneffectual and to cut even less ice than the orthodox
political approach (46)•
\-J Undoubtedly much of the work that was done by liberals in
the Joint Councils and the Institute of Race Relations served
a valuable social function in the presentation of facts : but
the failure to evolve a strategy that transcended a merely
pragmatic response to the existing trend of legislation left
liberals, at the onset of war# with no coherent ideological
alternative to Afrikaner nationalism. This was to prove
crucial for, as shall be seen the wor-time Smuts government was
sensitive, to some degree, to liberal pressure for reform of
^ the economic system with the onset of industrialisation brought
about by South Africa's isolation in the war. This was an
opportunity that could have been of great advantage to a
liberalism that was equipped with an understanding of nationalism.
But the one liberal, Alfred Hoernle, who did offer some sort
of shift in the emphasis of liberalism away from the individual
towards a wider recognition of groups, was repudiated by his colleagues
Hoernle's Phelps-Stokes Lectures of L939, South African Native
Policy and the Liberal Spirit, argued that "the liberal spirit" was
not confined to individuals but also included groups and that the
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liberty of the former rested on the recognition and respect of the
latter:
The varied possible excellencies of human nature must be
realised in individual human beings: concern for individuals,
respect for personality, respect for human nature and its
potentialities in every human being - these are one aspect
of the liberal spirit. But, individuals live their lives
as members of social groups, and the excellence of their
lives is relative, therefore, to the culture (in the widest
sense) of their group; the culture to the pattern of which
individual lives are moulded, the culture from which they
draw the materials, as it were, for a life worth living.
The liberal spirit, in this aspect,* shows itself as a
respect for social groups other than one's own, for cultures
other than one's own, for sentiments and traditions other
than one's own, though always coupled with a willingness
to share one's own (47).
- •)
This recognition of the power of groups in Hoernle's thought
needs further research: indeed a biography of this crucially
important thinker in South African history is very much needed.
But one possible influence may well have been Hoernle's
attendance at a conference of the Rasseverhoudingsbond van
Afrikaners in Pretoria on the 19th and 20th June 1935.
This conference, which had as its secretary M.D.C. de Wet Nel,
led to the formation of the Afrikanerbond vir Rassestudie and
represented an earlier version of the Bureau of Racial Affairs
that was formed in 1947. The Rasserverhoudingsbond was a . ,)
crucial development in the ethnic conception of culture, that
had been developed with the formation of the FAK in 1929, and
its extension into the sphere of race relations. Hoernle's
extensive notes of the addresses made at the conference suggest
his interest in the ideas of the proceedings. The tone of the
conference was an attack on the "civilising mission" of the
white man through such instruments as the missions and the
clergy. Various speakers suggested that the Africans should
be educated in their own vernacular to encourage a separate
identity that avoided turning blacks into whitemen (48).
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Undoubtedly, the assumptions behind many of the arguments
were racist (49), but, as Dunbar Moodie has pointed out,
there is an important non-racist stream in apartheid
represented by Dr W.W.M. Eiselen, who became Secretary of
Native Affairs under Verwoerd (50). The ethnic conception
of Afrikaner nationalism was believed applicable to various
tribal groupings, which were identifiable by early
1950s through the language maps of Van Warmelo (51),
and who were thought capable of their own autonomous
development in their respective cultural spheres. As
J a statement of the Afrikanerbond vir Rassestudie put it
in 1936:
Die Afrikaner erken die feit dat daar fn eeue-oue
Bantu-kultuur bestaan en derhalwe wil hy dat die naturel
gelei word deur kennis en verheerliking van God tot
herskepping van sy eie beskawing, waarin sy eie
kultuur, sy eie tradisies en sy taal hoofrol speel,
sodat die naturel uiteindelik oor sy eie eienskappe
kan beskik en die tot volmaaktheid kan ontwikkel
in die lig van Gods woord (52).
The power of such sentiments may well have been an
important reason why Hoernle felt the need by the end of
the 1930s to modify South African liberalism in order to
make it account for this group and ethnic basis to the
political conceptions of Afrikaner nationalists. In turn,
they also explain his gloom for the future of South Africa
which was at the stage of "heartbreak house" (53). Of three
possible alternatives for the future pattern of race relations
om South Africa, parallelism, assimilation and total
separation/ Hoernle could only see separation, whereby he
meant the "sundering or dissociation so complete as to destroy
the very possibility of effective domination" (54), as the
means by which the liberal spirit could be realised. But
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even then, Hoernle realised that separation was not
practical and offered "no ultimate hope for the liberal
spirit" (55) .
Hoernle1s main quest was to seek a strategy for
liberals in the South African context. To fail to do so
was, he argued, to accept the status quo- As he explained
 :
in a letter to G.J. Ponsonby: .
Nearly all our liberal efforts worjc, consciously or
unconsciously, within the parallelism framework and
to that extent accept segregation (56).
While in a memorandum he prepared for the Secretary of
Native Affairs, Douglas Smit, in 1941, Hoernle charged his
fellow liberals with failing to serve their principles by
refusing to evolve a strategy that could develop a society
without racial divisions:
In the present-day South African world, there is not, in
my opinion, any hope or prospect, of the realization,
under the leadership of the White castes, of the
obolition of the system of racial castes. But, I
fail to see how those liberals who, for this reason,
avoid, or refuse, or give up, the effort to think
out the application of liberal principles in some
kind of social structure without racial castes, are
really serving the cause of their principles most
effectively. It seems to me that, thereby, they allow
the upholders of an illiberal theory and practice to
win the contest by default. They confine their efforts
in fact, if not by intention - to ambulance work within
the caste society and tending to strengthen the caste
society; and they shut their eyes to, or else simply
remain unaware of, this fact (57).
But the liberal response to Hoernle's argument remained
a negative one. One reviewer of his Phelps-Stokes lectures
suggested in The Forum, for example, that
With his clear goal of obtaining greater liberty, an
increasing measure of fair play, and wider opportunity
for subject peoples, the liberal does not need to
define his "long range" programme as rigidly as
Professor Hoernle has attempted to do. Our programme
must evolve with rapidly changing circumstances (58).
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while Bishop Clayton, in an exchange of letters with
Hoernle, charged him with abandoning "hope" and taking the
line "that the structure of S.A. Society of fixed". "Like
you11, went on the Bishop, "I do not see how any change in
the structure of society is to come. I see no signs of .
such a change, and yet it seems to me that the criticism
and development of ambulance work within the present
framework may in itself lead to gradual changes within the
framework itself. If Native education can improve, if
the economic position of natives improves, it seems to me
^•s possible that the Walls of Jericho may fall down of
themselves" (59) .
This response typified the reaction of most liberals
of the period to Hoernle's arguments and indicated that there
was not going to be an articulation of an alternative
strategy to that of the prevailing "ambulance work" within
the existing political system (60). This nagative reaction
however, masked over an essential reluctance to perceive
Hoernle's failure to perceive the economic structures of
. "\ South African racial segregation. One particularly
penetrating review by George Findlay of Hoernle's phelps-
Stokes Lectures argued that the pivot of the argument hinged
on subjective attitudes (a product of Hoernle1s idealistic
philosophy) and ignored the economic context in which such
attitudes existed:
Ignoring the pyramid of production and its essential
character, affecting all our social correlations, he
(Hoernle) tends to attach primary importance to
psychological attitudes and secondary importance to real
external developments. He does not see that men's
minds must and inevitably will come into correlation
with the facts outside them, and that the mind cannot
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influence real developments unless it does so. Thus,
while he speaks of the "spirit" of this and the "ideal"
of that, he confuses the very basis of "domination"
(61).
Such arguments at least began to get to grips with the
essentially economic relationships involved in the group-
based struggle for control over economic resources in
South Africa. It afforded, too, the possibility of
gaining an insight into the economic basis of Afrikaner
• • • • . . ' . ,
nationalist mobilization. But Findlay's criticism seems
to have been largely lost on liberal thinking of the time,
which remained wedded to the classical free-market model. .:,
As such, therefore, Afrikaner Nationalism could only be
perceived in liberal eyes as an essentially irrational
phenomenon that worked against the laws of the economic
system.
A further result of this position was that from the time
of Hertzog's break with Smuts over the war issue in 1939
until the election of 1948, the tendency of liberalism, as
indeed of the United Party as a whole, was to link this
perceived irrationalism of Afrikaner nationalism with
Nazism. The most classic statement of this view is ^
probably to be found in Arthur Keppel-Jones's When Smus Goes,
which was first published in 1947 (62) . This dip into the
future foresaw a Nationalist victory leading, in somewhat
Orwellian terms, to the establishment of a Christian National
Republic, a police-state and a mass exodus of English-speakers
to Rhodesia. The whole emphasis, however, was nagative in
tone, as the very title suggests. There was no hint of any
positive alternative stance that could be taken to ward off
the perceived threat- The whole book indeed, personifies the
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inability of liberals to perceive the essentially economic
nature of Afrikaner nationalism. By simply writing off
Afrikaner nationalism as merely a brand of Nazism (which in
many cases may well have been actually true) , the liberals
merely revealed their own antinationalism:
We are faced with the urgent necessity of building a
New Order. We have to choose between the violence,
dogmatism, racialism and ignorance of the New Nazi order,
and a revised conception of our social and economic
condition, our ethical and religious system and the
idea (already becoming obsolete) of the state as "sovereign"
in its independence.
The hard school of experience has shown...that no state is
completely independent today; it cannot remain sovereign
) in the swift swirl of world movements; and a small statelike ours, unless it is prepared to take its stand on the
side of democrats in the struggle, is simply signing the
death warrant of its freedom.
The Malanite dream of retaining Afrikaner individuality
by discussing terms at the conference table or becoming
little Fuhrers under Adolf shows so little knowledge of
the Nazi mind that one has doubts about its sincerity (63) •
Undoubtedly some of these sentiments were based upon a new
politico-economic conception of the union brought on by the
industrialisation facilitated by South Africa's economic
isolation during the Second World war. Manufacturing, for
example, increased by 116% between 1939 and 1945 and the
>. industrial labour force rose by 53%, a large percentage of which
were non-whites (106,000 out of 125,000) who were moving into
skilled and semi-skilled jobs as many whites went off to fight
(64)• The effect of these economic changes was to boost the
liberal position that had clustered around the Hofmeyr wing of
the United Party. Hofmeyr, together with Lesley Blackwell, had'
decided not to break with the United Party in 1938 when they
resigned from the U.P. caucus (65) and they represented a
liberal pressure group within the U.P. during the course of the
war. Their arguments were articulated by the weekly magazine.
The Forum, which had been founded in 1938 with Hofmeyr on the
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Excluding the Rhodesians, and leaving the Belgian, French
and Portuguese colonies aside, the union's rightful sphere
of influence in Africa embraces a market of 40 millions -
an infinitely larger source of potential wealth than is vouch-
safed to either Canada or Australis (70).
With the establishment of this wider market and economic
contadts, there was also envisaged a transformation in political
structures that would transform the status of South Africa within
the British empire into a local centre in a wider federation.
The Cape Town parliament, therefore, wou^d be one of a "series
of Commonwealth Parliaments, each of them independent entities,
none subservient to each other, and with separate needs and
V requirements, yet each co-operating for purposes of defence and
other common objects which none can fulfill standing alone" (71).
This vision of the future South Africa, however, had little or no
place for internal national groupings.
The most important feature of this liberal ideal for
South Africa's internal political development was that it hit
the economic basis of the rising Afrikaner ethnic consciousness.
The strategy of seeking wider markets for secondary industry,
which were wholly under English-speaking control in this period,
^ and seeking the integration of urban Africans into the economic
system drew capital away from the area of the ethnically-based
primitive accumulation of the Afrikaner bourgeoisie. The liberal
conception of industrial development in South Africa presupposed
a market system where individual, as opposed to group interests •
predominated. There was, accordingly, no place for group
mobilization of capital on the basis of the strategy out-
lined at the Economic Congress in 1939. This strategy, indeed,
was viewed as "so fantastic a policy" that it could "lead to the
ruin of the country" (72). For it challenged the basic market
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board of directors- The Forum had an editorial council on
which sat R. J. Kingston Russell as editor in chief and managing
director, John Cope# T.J. Haarkoff and S.A. Frankel while among
its advisers were I.D. MacCrone and W.H. Hutt. The emphasis,
therefore, was strongly liberal in the classical tradition and
the nature of its arguments revealed a bisic lack of under-
standing of nationalism and group identities within South African
society. The basic objective of the magazine, indeed, was to
reduce nationalist sentiments in the search for a wider community
in Southern Africa that would facilitate the expansion of South
Africa's internal market: an earlier version, in fact, of South •'-'
Africa's "detente" policies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (66).
These arguments for a Pan-African community in Africa to some
extent took off from Smut's vesion of a white-controlled group
of states stretching from South Africa up to Kenya which he had
exponded in his lectures at Oxford in 1929 (67). But now they
combined with a strong emphasis on the need for internal reforms
of South African economic structures. This meant a change in the
system of pass laws and influx control:
The fact is that the African in our cities and towns is ..\
today an integral part of our industrial machinery upon "•'
whose stability and acquired skill our industry is
coming more and more to depend. But our laws continue to
treat him as a periodic peasant worker not wanted
permanently in the town (68)
While at the same time a rise in African wages would aid
secondary industrialisation:
In our own interest it is essential to raise the standard
of living among the Non-Europeans. Increased wages would
do that. It would also stimulate consumption of our
primary and secondary products (69).
With these changes, the future of South Africa lay in a
wider sphere of influence that would facilitate greater
industrialisation:
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conceptions of liberal ideology:
They overlook the fact that buying and selling are but two
aspects of the same process of exchange. If I act as a
buyer of shoes, it is only because I am a seller of something
else - say, wigs. To say that I will refuse to buy shoes
from X is the same as saying that I refuse to allow X to
be a shoemaker. Moreover, if X is no longer a shoemaker,
he will cease being a buyer of my wigs and, therefore, my
alleged superiority over him must vanish into thin air...
To be accurate, one should not use the terms "ours" and
"theirs" at all in talking about the National Income is
produced by the efforts of all the sections of the
community and it is quite absurd to argue that Natives
produce one function, Indians and Coloureds another,
Europeans a third and so on....We might just as well
calculate the further fractions contributed by women or
by men, by the married or by the unmarried, or by widows
and widowers. Such calculations are little less fantastic
than the idea if all Afrikaners... .were to bind themselves -.
together they could improve their position because they "•:••)
could now buy on terms which they would dictate and only
from those whom they approved of (73) .
It is thus not surprising to find, in this ideological
context, that the objectives of the Reddingsdaadbond were similarly
condemned. The RDB was seen as "isolationist" and, with the
precedent of Pearl Harbour, "History has shown that isolationist
economics cannot pay; indeed, the great lesson of our time is that
isolationism, whether in politics or education, religion or
sociology, is doomed to bring sterility and strife" (74).
But the liberal strategy, of course, failed to see that the s
ethnically based Afrikaner capitalism was able to mobilize
extensive appeal and to generate sufficient savings so as to
become a signigicant economic and political force by the end of
the 1940s. The basis of this mobilization needs further research,
focusing on the extension of an ethnically based national
consciousness among the mass of Afrikaners. It is quite possible
that the Ossewa Brandwag was an important ideological instrument
in this respect since it appealed to the Afrikaans-speaking white
working class as a defense organisation so that, despite its
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considerable political differences with the Nationalist Party
under Malan, it may have been crucial in the long-run political
mobilization of Afrikaners that put the Nationalists into power
in 1948 (75). This mobilization was essential for the Nationalist
success and has been largely ignored by Newell Stultz in his
analysis of Afrikaner politics between 1934 and 1948. Indeed,
to place the main cause for the Nationalists' success on the
"war vote" of 1939 completely misses the long-run structural trends
within the political system (76). Afrikaner Nationalism, has
shown itself as not a fixed entity but a series of class alliances
J that have exploited the opportunities for access to political power
and the control of the South African state. What is needed,
therefore, as Dan O'Meara has pointed out, is an analysis of
Afrikaner Nationalism that sees it as an ideology that "developed
historically as a response to social change, and is no immutable
weltanschuanq" (77)•
On the other hand, it is possible to place too much emphasis
on the active role of the Nationalist Party in mobilizing political
support for itself. While this was undoubtedly necessary in the
•A Nationalists' victory in 1948 and, as Alf Stadler has pointed out,
the Nationalist Party had many similarities to a populist party
based on an exclusive sectional appeal (78), to rest the
explanation at this point is to make the analysis teleological.
The mobilization of support for the Nationalists rested on a
variety of contingent factors which were substantially related to
the performance of the United Party government- It was not, in
other words, inevitable that the Nationalists were going to win
in 1948 (most people expected them to lose) and the election was
very closely fought. Clearly, one key factor was that the United
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Party lost support as opposed to the Nationalists actively winning
it. This losing of support undoubtedly came from the uncertain and
ambiguous ideology of the United Party by 1948 as a result of the
intrusion into its platform of the Hofmeyrian liberalism that
had been fostered by the Second World War. The extent of the
cleavage that this promoted within the UP before 1948 is still
rather uncertain and extensive research is needed into the UP
archives on this point (79). It seems clear, however, that by
1945 the position was one where gold-mining, while still exercising
overall political hagemony in the party, fealt that its position
was under considerable attack. As the 1945 "Programme of Action" '"••'
argued, for example:
The United Party cannot agree to the theory that gold is a
wasting asset which must be concerved (sic) and its
extraction be spread over a long period of time. On the
contrary, it believes that every encouragement should be
given for intensive gold-mining as this is the quickest and
surest way of developing the Union in other directions
industrially (80).
At the end of the war, therefore, the liberal wing in the
United Party still did not exercise political control, but had
probably succeeded in orientating the party increasingly in the
direction of its position. The crucial years for the U.P.'s :,)
fortunes can thus been seen to rest from 1946 to 1948 following
the 1946 African Mineworkers and the collapse of the Natives
Representative Council (81). The initial response of the united
Party government ot the strike was the establishment of the Native
Laws Commission under Justice Henry Fagan on the 16th August 1946.
But this only post-poned the question of eventual government
policy towards non-whites and the immediate problem of what the
government was going to do after the Natives Representative Council
had passed a resolution on the 15th August deprecating the
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government's "post-war continuation of a policy of Fascism",
remained. The dilemmas of the position were recognised by
Hofmeyr who foresaw a reaction from the European electorate:
It means that the hitherto moderate intellectuals of the
Professor (Z.K.) Matthews type are now committed to an
extreme line against colour discrimination, and havei carried
the chiefs with them. We can't afford to allow them to be
swept into the extremist camp, but I don't see what we can
do to satisfy them, which would be tolerated by European
public opinion (82).
But Hofmeyr was unable at this point to come out with a
strong liberal position on reform of the structures of native
administration established by the 1936 Hertzog legislation.
) This was partly because of his own personal deficiencies which
might never have allowed him to break with Smuts and also partly
because, as deputy prime minister, he was running the government
in Smuts's absence. Some liberals had hoped that he would be
able to seize the opportunity and lead a liberal party before
the next election. On the 25th September, for instance, Leo
Marquard wrote to him that "the only hope we have of defending
liberal ideals in South Africa lies in a party led by you" for
a party of this kind "based on the abolition of the colour bar in
•v industry and on some form of universal franchise would attract
to the fight for liberalism a very large number of left-liberals,
i
it would have your own personal following, and it would attract
a proportion of industrialists and men of the Van Eck and Van
Biljoen type" (83). Hofmeyr, however, preferred to work inside
the United Party despite the fact that, as Alan Paton records,
opposition within U.P. ranks was rising to his liberal stance (84),
while at the same time he was allienating himself from moderate
black opinion who saw him as a champion of white supremacy.
Indeed, Paton is probably right in saying that the crucial date
in Hofmeyr's liberal fortunes was the 26th November when a
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reconvened Natives Representative Council found itself unable to
co-operate with the government, as represented by Hofmeyr (85).
In this context, the crucial figure from the end of 1946 was not
Hofmeyr, who remained over-burdened by work and government duties
until January 1948, but Smuts, who returned from his visit over-
seas to the United Nations.
From the time that Smuts started to intervene in matters of
native policy, at the start of 1947, untfl the election capaign of
1948 prohibited any further work on the matter, it is clear that
the need for some kind of reform was recognised. Exactly what
kind of reform, and the economic and political implications that '- '•'
it would have entailed, remains a matter of historical debate (86),
and indeed cannot be dealt with fully in this paper. But it
seems certain that, while Smuts was no liberal, he felt and
recognised the need for gradual change. As he wrote to M.C.
Gillett on the 1st February 1947:
The fully publicized discussions at U.N.O. are having a
great effect in all directions. We even hear about them
from our domestic and farm natives who really have nothing
to complain of (sic), but are deeply stirred by all this
talk of equality and non-discrimination. X am so anxious
to stay this rot and get a move on to better relations,
but it is even more difficult now in view of these Native ^
slaims, which have just the opposite effect on European --/
mentality. Both extremes are gathering strength and it
is all the more difficult to find a via media as a solution.
The old Fabian slogan of gradualness would be the best solution
under the circumstances but the extreme tempers on both sides
almost rule this out. If only one could get people back
into a reasonable mood, but that is the very thing that has
disappeared on both sides. Still, I am anxious to try my
hand at a solution (87).
During the following months, therefore, various proposals
were discussed in the Department of Native Affairs, then under
the ineffective Piet van der Byl, the Native Affairs Commission
and with the Prime Minister himself. From an analysis of the
Douglas Smit papers, it seems that Smuts placed great reliance on
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the former Secretary of Native Affairs, Douglas Smit, who
had left the Native Affairs Department in 1945 and was a
member of the Native Affairs Commission. indeed, at Smuts's
express instruction, Smit's successor, G. Mears, sent depart-
mental memoranda for Smit's comments (88). The result of
this was that liberal pressures for changes of policy were ••'" - -
extremely powerful during the months of February to September '
1947 and could have led to a major change in governmental
policy. Most signigicantly, the proposals related to a
reform of the Natives Representative Council and a bill to
) recognise African trade unions, the Industrial Tribunals Bill.
Hints of changes in these spheres were given by Musts in
a meeting with members of the Natives Representative Council
on the 8th May, 1947. Here, Smuts promised greater de-
volution of powers to the NRC to make it "a real working
institution, helpful to the good government of this country" (89),
together with a proposal to link up the urban advisory boards for
Africans with the NRC into a general congress of such boards.
Regarding trade unions. Smuts proposed reforms to recognise
N African trade unions on similar lines to those of white unions in
the Industrial Conciliation Act, though not going so far as Edgar
Brookes's proposal in the Native Affairs Commission to bring
the African unions within the scope of the latter act (9O) .
The Bill that Smuts proposed was to follow the machinery of the
Industrial Conciliation Act, though no strikes were to legally
take place as a consequence (91). •i:
But the problem of these proposals possibly clashing with the
proposals of the Fagan Commission when it reported, together
with the coming election, meant that by September they had to be
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shelved. By this time, after discussions between Smit and the
Native Affairs Department and the Native Affairs Commission a
Progressive Programme for Native Administration was drafted
which envisaged a reformed NRC with 50 elected members with
powers to impose a personal tax on Africans, to allocate funds
to councils for certain approved services and "to make laws
for the Native areas in respect of such matters as may from time
to time be approved by the Governor-General" (92). In addition,
the programme envisaged a system of elected African councils
at a "tribal", district and local and general level which were to
function as they had done in the past while in urban areas a '\3
Union Advisory Boards Congress which was to be constituted
"especially for the representation to the Government, through the
Natives Representative Council, of the views of urbanised Natives
only" (93). These were hardly radical proposals, but when
they came up for discussion on the 1st September 1947, Smuts felt
it necessary to post-pone their implementation until after the
election (94) .
One key factor in this decision, fatal as it was to prove
for the United Party, was that Smuts had very few doubts on the .-^.»
J *
U.P.'s ability to win the election. Despite the Nationalist
attacks on Hofmeyr and Smuts's supposed links with "Hoggenheimer",
Smuts believed that it would be able to win because of the
Nationalists1 discredited war record. Boubtless, the long
years away from South Africa, toghther with Smuts*s own isolation
through old age and lack of understanding of contemporary trends
increased his illusions. Indeed, his main problem by the 4th May
1948 was how to fit in the formation of his cabinet after the
election before going off the Cambridge to be installed as
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Chancellor (95). But this political ineptitude of Smuts is
not the only reason by far for the United Party's defeat.
The liberal element in the party was hampered by its un-
willingness to suggest a clear ideological alternative to
the existing party line of muddling through on the previous
government's record (96). This was partly due to a lack of -
direction from the top. After the election, for example, c: ; ;
Richard Currie wrote to Hofmeyr to say that the Rivonia-
Morningside branch of the United Party in his constituency
had had no information or direction or information since its
•* inception which had led to a situation where:
...the political aspects of the political activities
of the United Party affecting this branch, and all
United Party supporters, have been completely ignored,
and all that memebers have been asked to do is to
organise the branch from the electoral viewpoint.
While acknowledging this essential service, members
have been pointed in their criticism and dissapointment
in the way political direction and information have been
lacking. This disappointment is having a serious
adverse effect on the efficiency and enthusiasm of the
branch (97) -
One possible reason for this has the defensive nature of
liberalism by 1948. The ideological developments previously
^\ out-lined, together with the tardy and inadequate reforms that
were being suggested by 1947, left liberalism with no viable
political base in the United Party by 1948. This weakness has
to be seen in the context of the growing appeal of nationalism
among whites, especially afrikaners, after the war; Combined
with this appeal was a racist appeal that likened liberalism
with black domination (see appendix for cartoons). This
nationalist and racist appeal, epitomised in Malan's manifesto
of March 1948 (98), left liberalism with little or no counter.
The serious ideological deficiencies within liberalism had
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failed to be able to meet the challenge of nationalism, though
at the same time they had been able, for a brief period, to
re-orientate the political stance of the united Party
Government in the post-war period or native policy. The
effect of this however was to bring a reaction that ended the
possibilities of reform in the interests of non-whites in South
Africa for at least a generation. On the liberals fell the blame
for the U.P.'s loss in 1948 and their positibn continued to
deteriorate within the white political system such that when
the Liberal Party was eventually formed it was created outside
the parliamentary context. As Smuts wrote to M.C. Gillett on rr)
the 28 June 1948 after the election:
What is called Liberalism is at a discount here even more
than in Britain, and Hof's liberal views have been exploited
against the party in a most unfair way. My successor
must be killed in advance of his advent (99).
Paul Rich,
University of the Witwatersrnad,
January 1976.
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